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SOCIAL SECURITY AND RETIREMENT RESEARCH: FROM RESEARCH TO POLICY
My assignment is to discuss "How has research affected Social Security policy and retirement policy broadly defined in the United States?" My answer is that research has affected Social Security policy and thereby retirement policy a lot. 1 As a recipient of a large grant from the Social Security Administration (SSA), I would like to say, "Not a single provision in the Social Security program was decided without a major research study by outside economists." In fact, my reading of history suggests the opposite. All the major decisions about Social Security -the extension of coverage, large benefit increases, the tilt in the benefit formula, the introduction of disability insurance, the passage of Medicare, automatic indexing of tax and benefit bases and cost-of-living adjustments -emerged from the recommendations of an agency with a natural monopoly on research and a mandate to use research to improve the program.
Social Security's dominance of the research and policy agenda ended in the 1970s as Social Security faced tough financial sledding and beginning in 1980 a Republican Administration shut down SSA's research shop. At the same time, academic research outside SSA, which began as a trickle in the 1960s, turned into a torrent in the 1970s and 1980s. Some of the research was supportive; some was critical. The important point, however, is that it had minimal influence because by then all the pieces were in place.
My conclusion is that research in the hands of reformers serves as the fodder for change.
Otherwise, research acts as a constraining force operating at the margins. Let me spend a few minutes explaining how I arrived at these conclusions. For this exercise, I find it useful to break history into three periods: 1935 -1972, 1973 -1993, and 1994 to the present.
1935-1972: Social Security -the Only Game in Town
Although economists showed intense interest in Social Security just before and after the legislation was enacted, they generally turned to other topics soon thereafter. Aaron (1966) and Peter A. Diamond (1965) re-iterated the point in subsequent articles. 4 I was the research assistant on the Aaron-Pechman-Taussig book, and that project was the first time I had contact with Bob Ball and Bob Myers. Just as we were about to put the project to bed, we received almost 100 pages of comments from Bob Ball, which had to be incorporated in a very short period of time. The significant role played by Ball and others at SSA makes it difficult to figure out in retrospect who was influencing whom. 5 Under SEC. 702 of the Social Security Act of 1935 "The Board …shall also have the duty of studying and making recommendations as to the most effective methods of providing economic security through social insurance, and as to legislation and matters of administrative policy concerning old-age pensions, unemployment compensation, accident compensation, and related subjects." 6 The full objective reads as follows:
Objective 13: Carry on a program of research which will contribute most effectively to improvement of the program. Inherent in the administration of any program is the duty to improve its effectiveness. This obligation is reinforced in our case by the statutory other words, the agency set up and put significant resources in to a shop that documented the need for social insurance and explored means to provide it most effectively.
Although SSA frequently made information available to the public, Social Security research was not designed primarily to report on the status quo; the goal of the research was to improve the program.
It took a while, however, for the research to bear fruit. Between 1940 and 1950, virtually no changes were made in Social Security. As a result in 1950 the program was small; only 60 percent of the workforce was covered, benefits were extremely modest, and few people were getting them. Senators interested in courting the elderly were more likely to improve the means-tested old-age assistance program than Social Security, so it is not surprising that average monthly benefits under old-age assistance ($42) were higher than average retirement benefits ($25).
7
The 1950 amendments changed all that; they significantly expanded coverage by including the non-farm self employed and regularly employed domestic workers, and raised benefits by 77 percent. These changes reflected many of the recommendations of the 1947 Advisory Council. 8 Social Security research presented to the Council duty of the Department to study and make recommendations as to the most effective methods of providing economic security through social insurance. In addition, from both public and private sources there is a constant stream of proposals for change. The Bureau must equip itself to provide pertinent facts and to recommend policy positions on these proposals. The Bureau must have foresight and be prepared to deal with proposals and issues that will emerge as the program matures. It must also be equipped to deal with the policy issues that will arise with respect to relationships between OASI and other expanding public and private programs for income maintenance. To meet these responsibilities the Bureau must maintain an effective long-range program of research and analysis (Ball 2000 forthcoming). Ball reports that he got the idea of writing down the agency's objectives from Peter F. Drucker's 1954 book The Practice of Management, which argued that successful companies reduced their goals to simple concepts. 7 The 1935 Social Security Act provided funding for state-run old-age assistance programs that provided means-tested benefits to poor people age 65 and over. 8 Although some commentators have characterized the 1947 Advisory Council as a creature of the Social Security bureaucracy (Derthick 1979 ), Ball contends that it was a very independent-minded group. The associate chairman Sumner Slichter, a Harvard Economics professor who served as an advisor to several large corporations, took over as the de facto chair from Edward Stettinius, and had strong opinions about the role of social insurance. For example, he had no interest in a government health insurance program for the elderly, and that topic was quickly dropped from the agenda. Ball served as executive director of the 1947 Advisory Council. Although he had worked for Social Security in the past, at the time he was documented glaring gaps between Social Security benefits and those offered under the means-tested old-age assistance programs and showed how the lack of coverage for farm workers placed a great burden on agricultural states that had to pay for a portion of oldage assistance benefits.
The 1950 amendments were only the beginning of a major expansion in social insurance programs. The 1956 amendments added disability insurance for those 50 to 65, and subsequent legislation (1960) added workers under 50 and their dependents. Legislation in 1965 introduced Medicare. At the same time, amendments in 1952, 1954, 1958, 1965, 1967, 1969, and 1971 more or less kept benefits up to date with wages and prices. Even before disability insurance was extended to younger workers, she conducted a survey of the disabled, which served as a benchmark for subsequent analysis and provided the first information on beneficiaries' experience with vocational rehabilitation.
She also sponsored The 1962 Survey of the Aged, which was the first comprehensive report on the economic status of older Americans (1963) . 9 This report provided information on labor force activity, earnings, and assets. It also described the elderly's appointed he had left to help set up a training institute for Social Security and public assistance personnel under the auspices of the American Council of Education. 9 Although the 1962 survey was the first comprehensive report, Social Security had undertaken a series of beneficiaries' surveys in the 1940s and 1950s. Edna Wentworth summarized the results of these surveys in a number of articles (July 1943 , May 1950 , August 1952 , April 1954 in the Social Security Bulletin.
use of health care and their methods of paying, which helped document their need for health insurance. Mollie Orshanky's development of a poverty standard and a series of reports documenting that nearly 30 percent of the elderly were poor, compared to less than 15 percent of the non-elderly, set the groundwork for significant benefit increases.
Not only was SSA actively engaged in research, but also the agency had virtually no competitors. Academics generally had not mastered the details, and even those who had, such as Aaron, Pechman, and Taussig, quoted Social Security surveys to document the status of the aged, the resources needed for families of different sizes, or describe pension provisions in other countries. Similarly, Congressional staffs rarely had the expertise in social insurance and relied enormously on SSA research and actuarial staff when assessing legislation. In short, for the first three decades of the program Social Security had a monopoly on research, produced a first class product, and used it effectively to document the need for improved benefits and to get legislation passed. Third, Social Security was on the defensive because a technical flaw in the indexing provisions and a disastrous economy placed the program in financial jeopardy.
The problem with these earlier surveys was that beneficiaries were a very small subset of the elderly population. 10 In addition to these major forces, in 1974 the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act set up the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to provide the Congress with objective and timely analysis needed for economic and budget decisions. 
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A second strain of research explored the impact of Social Security on labor force activity.
My reading of the conclusions is that the availability of Social Security benefits encourages people to retire, but their retirement decisions are not particularly sensitive to modest changes in the initial benefit amount. Moreover, Social Security probably has very little impact on the work effort of younger people.
In addition to research on saving and labor force issues, a number of monographs appeared arguing for reform of the entire system. Some of these were based on different values or goals; some were based on concerns about efficiency. Those concerned with 12 The World Bank study concluded, "…Numerous empirical investigations (most of them based on U.S. data) have been unable to prove conclusively that saving did, indeed, drop once pay-as-you-go programs were established…. Analyses of saving rates in other countries yield similar conflicting results. Studies of the saving impact of old age security programs in Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom found no significant impact, except for a slightly positive effect in Sweden where the pension program is heavily funded." efficiency generally recommended restructuring the program to separate income replacement from redistribution. Economists thought that such a separation would make the whole process tidier. This tidier approach seemed particularly appealing in light of the truly unsightly differences in the treatment of one-earner and two-earner couples.
None of this research, however, had any impact on the two major pieces of legislation during this period -the 1977 and the 1983 Amendments. The 1977 legislation was aimed at correcting a technical flaw in the indexing procedure that was increasing replacement rates and creating large deficits. In addition to fixing the flaw, the legislation extensively revised both the benefit and revenue provisions to reduce the longrange deficit. Most of the additional revenue to meet the long-run problem came from increasing a rate hike planned for 2011 and making it fully effective by 1990. This meant that the increase in revenues would take place as costs were declining as a percent of taxable payrolls, resulting in a substantial accumulation of reserves.
The 1977 legislation did not restore long-run actuarial balance, and in addition a shortrun financing crisis soon emerged that would have prevented Congress from paying benefits. To restore actuarial balance, the 1983 Amendments again introduced a series of benefit and tax changes, including moving three-quarters of the scheduled tax rate from 1990 to 1988. The combined impact of the benefit cuts and tax increases further increased projected trust fund accumulations. Under the 1983 legislation, the trust funds were projected to build up to more than five times annual outlays by 2020 and then be drawn down between 2020 and 2060.
Contrary to revisionist history, the buildup in the trust funds was not done to accumulate reserves in anticipation of the retirement of the baby boom but rather emerged simply as a result of moving up a scheduled rate increase. The Greenspan Commission recognized that a fund would accumulate, but had not considered its impact on financial markets or the economy. Moreover, the idea of building up a fund and then drawing it down does not make sense from any perspective other than financing convenience. In short, a major change was made to the Social Security program almost inadvertently and certainly without any consideration of the economic implications of such a buildup or draw down.
The other important change to emerge from the 1983 legislation was an extension of the age at which workers would be eligible for full benefits from 65 to 67. This change was made because it was the only politically acceptable way to cut benefits. At the time, researchers had not provided any convincing evidence that improvements in mortality were being accompanied shifts in morbidity. Even if such evidence were available, it certainly was not considered by the Congress as it enacted the change in the so-called normal retirement age. Council was the first official document to include privatization proposals. It was also the first time that anyone had fully costed out what it would take to move from the current system to one with funded defined contribution accounts, fully recognizing the costs of transition. The privatization debate has dominated the discussion since that report, and research has played a very important role in that debate. Although first rate research has been produced on both sides of this debate, on balance research has served as a conservative force. Unlike the formative years of Social Security, no one has a monopoly 13 The Greenspan Commission did not recommend extending the normal retirement age. 14 The 75-year deficit increased from 1.46 percent of taxable payrolls in 1993 to 2.13 percent in 1994.
on doing research; it is a competitive market out there, and dueling studies make it difficult for research to carry the day.
Moreover, the institutions interested in retirement research are fostering the competition.
The Social Security Administration is once again in the research business; it has built up its own staff, formed partnerships with research economists on the outside, and funded two Centers, one at Boston College and one at the University of Michigan. It actively supports both those for and those against introducing individual accounts. Similarly, the National Academy of Social Insurance convened an Expert Panel on Privatization, which stimulated a lot of research on issues surrounding individual accounts (Diamond 1999) .
Not only do studies show conflicting conclusions or different interpretations of existing information, but the sheer weight of the evidence makes it difficult to move. Any dramatic change in a large and important program is fraught with difficulties, and the more research that emerges the more the difficulties become apparent. Research also eliminates some of the simplistic arguments that would make privatization appealing.
For example, work by Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1998) carefully distinguishes between privatization, prefunding, and diversification and debunks the notion that privatization alone can lead to higher returns. My sense is that at least one if not more of the authors of that study may favor individual accounts, but their work demonstrates clearly that this preference has to be based on something other than an improvement in returns.
In short, in a competitive environment, research slows change. At this point, this should be viewed as positive rather negative because we are dealing with a very important and successful program.
Conclusion
Let me conclude. In an introduction to Henry Aaron's 1979 book Politics and Professors that looked at the expansion and subsequent rollback of Great Society programs, Bruce
MacLaury characterized Henry's findings as follows:
"…faiths and beliefs, not research, are the real basis for commitment to social reform. …Research tends to be a conservative force because it fosters skepticism by shifting attention from moral commitment to analytical problems that rarely have clear-cut or simple solutions."
I think that conclusion also applies to research and retirement policy. It was the "faiths and beliefs" of the people associated with the early years of the Social Security that provided "the commitment for social reform." They envisioned and then worked to enact a social insurance system so that people would have the protection they needed in case of disability, premature death, retirement, and ill health. They used research as a tool in this effort, and were in the enviable position of having a monopoly on the relevant information. Research alone "tends to be a conservative force," because it shifts "attention from moral commitment to analytical problems that rarely have clear-cut or simple solutions." That conservative force is desirable when dealing with a program as important and successful as Social Security. We do not want to make a mistake.
